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ON RELATIVE SOVEREIGNTYt
PART II
HANS AuFRiCHT

VI.

RELATIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE STRUCTURE OF THE

RULE

OF LAW

Many students of international law maintain that the rules of international.
law are basically different from those of domestic law. The most frequent
arguments denying the legal nature of international law are: (1) The
sources of 'international law differ from those of domestic law;109 (2) The
addressees of international law differ from those of domestic law ;11o (3) International law cannot be enforced.""
As for the sources of international law," 2 it is evident that treaties
originate in legislatures and that executive agreements emanate from the
executive branch of government. Hence, treaties and executive agreements
are created in the same way as statutes and ordinances, the main sources
of domestic law. In respect to the rules of customary law, it should be
recalled that neither domestic nor international rules of customary law
originate in legislative or administrative branches." 3 General principles of
law recognized by civilized nations in the sense of Art. 38, Section 3 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice are by definition
principles of law borrowed from domestic law." 4 Accordingly, the contentThis is the second of two installments appearing under this heading. The first
part of Mr. Aufricht's article appeared in (1944) 30 CORNELL L. Q. 137.
09
See Triepel, Le rapports entre le droit interne et le droit international (1923) 1
RECUEIL DES COURS 82. "L'opposition entre ces deux syst~mes [sc. international and
domestic law] est . . .une opposition des sources juridiques."
1101d. at 81. "Le droit international public r~gle des rapports entre des Etats et
seulement entre des Etats parfaitement 6gaux." Italics supplied.
"See the statement of the Grotius Society on the "Future of International Law,"
unanimously accepted by the Society in December 1941. "It is often overlooked that
the term 'law' is used in the expression 'international law' in a sense different from
that in which it is used in the expression 'municipal law.' In the municipal sphere
States are in a position to enforce their laws, and these receive authoritative interpretation from Courts of law with unlimited authority to determine all disputes which may
arise within their jurisdiction. In regard to international law, there is at present
no authority having the power ard means of enforcement. . . . Without enforcement
ability to appropriate organs, international law will continue to be defied with impunity ..
" quoted in (1942) 36 Ami. J. INT. L. 451. Cf. contra Borchard, The Place
of Force
in InternatioalLaw (1942) 36 AM. J. INT. L. 628 et seq.
2
" For the various meanings implied in the term "sources" of international law see
BRIGGS, THE LAW OF NATIONS

(1938)

45.

13In theory "case law" is of minor importance in international law.
On the
principle of stare decisis in international law see Art. 38 and 59 of the Statute of the
P.C.I.J. and M. 0. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 19201942:4 A TREATISE (1943) 627 et seq.
11 See FINCH, THE SOURCES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1937) 97.
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tion that the sources of international law are fundamentally different from
the sources of domestic law is hardly justifiable.
The controversial question whether and to what extent "natural law"
constitutes part of domestic or international law is outside the scope of this
n5
essay.
The argument that international law is directed to other addressees than
domestic law is by no means more convincing. In a federal system, for
example, many rules bearing upon the federation as such are addressed
to the "nation as a whole." Likewise, certain rules of international law
are directed to the federation rather than to the individual units of which
the federation is composed.110 On the supposition that there are rules
of international law which are addressed to private individuals, 117 private
individuals too are subjects of international law. In addition, even an
international or supranational body may be the addressee of domestic acts.
If, for instance, Congress appropriates funds in support of the United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, a domestic act of the United
States is addressed to an international or supranational agency. Consequently, the attempt to cast doubt on the validity of international law on
the ground that the subjects of international law fall necessarily under another category than the addressees of domestic law is futile.
The most serious attack against the legal nature of international law
comes apparently from that quarter which points to the shortcomings of
law enforcement under international law.
It should be clear, however, that many domestic agencies "enforce,"
that is to say "apply," international law, and American courts have time
and again served as enforcement agencies of international law." 8 This is
not surprising, since the Constitution expressly designates treaties as the
supreme law of the land," 9 and since all other rules not embodied in treaties
are covered by the common law maxim that international law is incorporated
115 0n the relationship of natural and international law see LeFur, La thiorie die droit
naturel depis le XVIIe siacle et ta doctrine noderte (1927) 18 REcuEIL DES COURS
263, 398, 438. See also Herbert Wright, The Moral Bases of International Law (1941)
PROc.6 Am. Soc. INT. L. 52.

11 See Art. 2 of the Cowventions of Rights and Duties of States, signed at Montevideo,
December 26, 1933. "The Federal State shall constitute a sole person in the eyes of

international law." See contra the Soviet Autonomy Decrees of February 1, 1944 in
International Cotwiliation No. 398 (March, 1944) 247.
"TSee
note 40 supra.
118 See the subtitle of C. C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED
AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES

(1922).

See also H. H. Sprout, Theories as to

the Applicability of International Law in the Federal Conurts of the United States

(1932) 26 Am. J. INT. L. 280.
119U. S. CoxsT. Art. VI, § 2.
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in and in some sense forms part of the law of the land.' 20 Similarly, administrative agencies such as customs officials and the Coast Guard are entrusted with the administration of international law. 12 '
As previously indicated, foreign states are not subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States courts unless they waive their immunities under international law; this, however, should not detract from the often neglected fact
that American courts and administrative agencies administer not only domestic but also international law.
To be sure, evidence of the legal nature of international law need not
be confined to disproving more or less arbitrary criticisms of international
law. It can also be demonstrated in a positive manner that the structure
of the rule of law'2 2 is virtually the same in international and domestic law.
This statement requires clarification, the more so, because so far no agreement on the legal nature of the domestic rule of law has been reached among
123
jurists.
There are at least two methods of defining law: The one that follows
the classical method of definition by reference to the superior concept and
the specific difference, the other by reference to the necessary conceptions
of law. Austin has applied the former method in his famous definition of
law 124 as a command, issued by the sovereign, inflicting evil or pain. On
the other hand, Austin considers it as one of the prime tasks of general
jurisprudence to determine the necessary concepts of law.'2
It is conspicuous that the leading authors of the school of analytical jurisprudence followed, as far as domestic law is concerned, Austin's second
suggestion in attempting to build their systems of jurisprudence on the necessary concepts of law. Of course, every new writer presented his table of
essential legal concepts as the definitive one, 12 6 but looked upon those of his
predecessors, including Austin, as more or less unnecessary concepts of law.127
1200n this maxim see E. D. Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation
(1932) 26 Am. J. IN4T. L. 239.
12 1 For other problems of law enforcement see note 279 infra.

' 22 See note 206-208 infra.
l23Cf.

e.q., J. HALL, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE (1938) Passin and Pound, Fifty
Years
of Jurisprudence (1936-1937) 50 HARv. L. REv. 171, 444, 777.
24
1

See AUSTIN, LEcruRFs

ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILoSOPHY OF PosiTIvE LAW

(Campbell
ed. 1875), Lecture I, §§ 19, 20, 29.
12 5d., Lecture XI, § 354. "Of the principles, notions and distinctions which are
the subject of general jurisprudence, some may be esteemed necessary. For we cannot imagine coherently a system of law (or a system of law as evolved in a refined
community),
without conceiving them as constituent part of it."
12 6 For a synoptic table of the basic concepts of Austin, Holland, Terry, Salmond,
Hohfeld and Kocourek, see HALL, op. cit. supra -note 123, at 527.
127The writer does not feel free from this sin. See note 138 infra.
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The great majority of jurists who followed Austin's suggestions in their
analysis of domestic law ignored his imperative doctrine of law. But when
the nature of international law was under discussion, many jurists blamed
international law for not conforming with Austin's definition of law as a
command.
However this may be, an attempt shall be made in this essay to define the
2
rule of law by reference to the necessary concepts of law.1 8
Every rule of law includes a person, a fact, a legal effect, and a norm.
12 9
Every rule of law is addressed to at least one person.
In every rule of law a legal effect is attached to a "fact" in the legal
parlance. 2 0 But not every "fact" is legally relevant. A fact which today
is legally irrelevant may tomorrow be subject to legal regulation. Conversely,
a fact which today brings about a legal effect, may tomorrow be legally
irrelevant. For example, a commodity which is rationed today may be
taken off the ration list tomorrow. Thus the same fact 'or the same transaction may have different legal effects under different circumstances.
The legal effect need not necessarily be a "sanction."' 3 1 Although many
rules of law provide for punishment, it would be erroneous to assume that
"law" is "law" only if a sanction is attached. Many rules of domestic
a2
law contain no sanction, but create legal effects nevertheless.
The norm, although it does not .appear on the surface of a rule, indicates
the level of the rule-for instance, the international or the constitutional
33
level-and determines the legal effect.'
' 28"Rule of law" when used in this paper in a generic sense is the general pattern of
law to which each individual legal -rule conforms. The writer is aware that from the
viewpoint of common law ".

.

. the rule of law is a great ideal; and useful in the

social struggle are all the elements of this ideal-the inviolability of the 'law of the
land,' the responsibility of the state for the wrong of its servants, the independence of
the judiciary, equality before the law, and the individual civil liberties." SEAGLE, THE
QUEST FOR LAW (1941) 227. See also Pound, Rule of Law, 13 ENcyc. Soc. SCIENCES
463.29
' See notes 134 and 138 infra.
'SOSee Justice Brandeis in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 410,
52 Sup. Ct. 443, 449 (1931). "In every such case the decision, in the first instance, is
dependent upon the determination of what in legal parlance is called a fact, as distinguished from the declaration of a rule of law. When the underlying fact has been
found, the legal result follows inevitably."
31
See Austin's definition of "sanction." AUSTIN, op. cit. upra note 124, at § 24:
"The evil which will probably be incurred in case a command be disobeyed or (to use
an equivalent expression) in case a duty be broken, is frequently called a sanction.
The command or duty is said to be sanctioned by the chance of incurring the evil. .. ."
See id. at § 26: "If we put reward into the import of the term sanction, we must
engage in a toilsome and probably unsuccessful struggle with the current of ordinary
speech."
' 3 2 See note 19 supra and 205 infra.
133
See note 205 infra.
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These elements of the rule of law, namely, person, fact, legal effect, and
norm, are linked by the category of imputation.'3 Actually, a legal effect
results only, if a definite fact can be imputed to a definite person in accordance
with a controlling norm.
Moreover, the legal order as a complex system of rules of law is to be
understood as a set of rules of different levels. This principle is, for instance,
at the bottom of the American system of judicial review of acts of Congress
claimed to be unconstitutional. 1m
In gendral, every developed system of law is a hierarchic system. 13 6 To
be sure, not all legal systems encompass the same number of levels. It is
obvious that a federal system of government is more complex than a unitarian system. In any case, the very distinction between international and
domestic norms presupposes that these two types of norms are of a different
rank in the underlying hierarchy of norms.
Since a legal system composed of meaningless or mutually contradictory
rules would be absurd, it is generally assumed that the rules of law are
based upon a common meaning.' 37 Unless meaning is recognized as a
necessary concept of law, any effort to interpret a given rule or to justify
the reasoning of a court would be in vain.
If, at last, the categories of space and time are added, the catalogue of
the necessary concepts of law appears completed; it includes: person, fact,
13
legal effect, norm, imputation, hierarchy, meaning, space and time. 8

' 3 4Imputation as the category of legal correlation can be visualized as having two
endpoints whereby two elements of the rule of law are mutually connected. The following scheme may illustrate this statement:
Norm
A
r\
Person

Person

Fact
Legal effect
Thus one might be justified in speaking of a normative, personal, and factual endpoint
of imputation.
'13Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176, 2 L. ed. 60, 73 (1803) "The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is
on a level with ordinary legislative acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please
to 3alter
it."
' 6The so-called Austrian school of international law styled the hierarchic structure
of the legal order the "Pyramid of Law" or the "Stufenbau der Rechtsordnung." See
Kunz, The Vienna School and InternationalLaw (1934) 11 N. Y. U. L. Q. REV., 385 ff.
This terminology may be misleading. By confounding the hierarchy of law with the
hierarchy of the rules of law the structural elements of the rule of law may be
obscured. See also Dickinson, The Law Behind the Law (1929) 29 COL. L. REv. 319,
n. 378.
1 7 0n conflict between rules of different levels see note 209 infra.
188 See notes 206-208 infra.
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The foregoing analysis permits of the preliminary conclusion that the
structure of international and domestic rules is,in principle, identical. Only
on this assumption is it meaningful to designate international law as "law."
It should be added that the concept of the hierarchy of rules when applied
to the relationship between international and domestic law signifies that
international rules, because of their higher rank in the hierarchy of rules,
prevail in principle over conflicting domestic rules.
The superiority of international over domestic law. or the primacy of
international law' 39 is, however, subject to the following qualifications: A
domestic act which is at variance with international law is voidable but
not void. 140 So long as the domestic act has not been challenged either in
the courts or through the ordinary channels of international intercourse, it
remains in force, its incompatibility with international rules notwithstanding.
Furthermore, limitation of a state's sphere of domestic jurisdiction is not
presumed. 141 Whoever asserts such a limitation carries the burden of
proof.1 4 2 Finally, it is not presumed that a legislature, in passing a statute,
142
intended to evade or to counteract international law. '
As previously indicated, within every rule of law a distinction can be
made between what might be called the "normative" and the "personal" endpoint of imputation.143 In determining the highest or supreme endpoint of
imputation one should differentiate between the sovereign State as the typically highest person144 in an underlying hierarchy of persons and the international norm as the supreme norm in. the hierarchy of norms. 145 An awareness
of this distinction may contribute to avoiding the all too frequent confusion
4
of the sovereignty of the state with the sovereignty of international norms.
In short, "relative sovereignty" as expounded in Sections II to V147 fits
into the pattern of the rule of law, because it is closely related to the necessary
concepts of law. Accordingly, relative sovereignty has been described as a
139 See note 210 in!ra.
14oSee
VERDROSS, VULKERRECHT (1937) 71.
41

' See P. C. I. J., Ser. A, No. 24, at 12 (1930) : "In case of doubt a limitation

of 42
sovereignty must be construed restrictively."
1 See the interpretation of the Xth Amendment to the Constitution in The Collector
v. Day. 11 Wall. 113, 124, 20 L. ed. 122, 125 (1871). "It is a familiar rule of construction of the Constitution of the Union that the sovereign powers vested in the
State governments by their respective Constitutions, remained unaltered and unimpaired
except so far as they were granted to the government of the United States."
2
14
See note 187 infra.
43
1 See note 134 supra.
144For supranational persons see supra p. 143.
1'405 See note 13 mtpra.
1 See note 7 supra.
47

1 See supra pp. 138-142.
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relationship between two normative elements of the rule of law, when it has
been designated as a relationship between international and domestic norms
(Section II).148 In discussing the legal position of the "independent" state,
relative sovereignty has been characterized as a relationship between the
14
normative and the personal elements of the rule of law (Section III, A). 9
This holds true, everything being equal, with respect to international norms
addressed to supranational persons (Section III, C), or to private individuals (Section III, F). In regard to "equality of states," relative sovereignty hhs been presented as a relationship among two or more persons
of equal rank. (Section III, B). 150 Facts in the legal parlance have been
touched upon in conjunction with discussion of the sphere of domestic jurisdiction (Section III, G). 151 Finally, relative sovereignty has been discussed
in reference to space and time (Sections IV and V).

VII.

RELATIVE SOVEREIGNTY

A.

AND

DEFINITION

OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Vertical View on International Law

Insight into the hierarchic structure of the legal system may help to elucidate the apparent paradox that something "absolutely" highest is to be considered relative at the same time.
Above all, the distinction between a hierarchy of norms and hierarchy of
persons may contribute to dispelling widespread confusion concerning the
legal nature of sovereignty.
The hierarchy of norm levels, which in American public law is reflected in
the distinction between city ordinances and charters, state statutes and state
constitutions, federal executive and legislative acts, the Federal Constitution,
treaties and other rules of international law is a rigid one. In other words,
if one disregards norms of natural law, international norms are the absolutely highest norms in relation to the subordinated levels of law. 152
In contrast, the hierarchy of persons is a variable one, that is to say States,
in the sense of international law, are the normal persons of international
148Ibid.

1490 See supra pp. 139 ff.
16
See suPra pp. 142 ff.
' 16See
supra p. 147.
152When a Federal State is transformed into an unitarian State the hierarchy of
domestic norm levels may be "streamlined" or even eliminated as evidenced by German
measures of Gleichschaltung after 1933. Nevertheless, international and domestic
norms are still conceived as of different levels. For the attempt of National Socialism
to eliminate even the difference between international and domestic norms by defining
international law as Aussenstaatsrecht, see note 33 supra.
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law. 58 Therefore, unless a special agreement is concluded between "independent" states, no personal unit is of a higher level than the State. Yet,
whenever by international agreement a supranational agency is instituted
or authorized to function ad hoc,15 the supranational agency is thereby made
the immediate addressee of international norms. In addition, all legal acts
originating in the supranational agency may affect States, 15 5 States and
157
individuals, 5 6 or individuals only.
Similarly, the private individual may be the addressee of rules of customary international law or of international conventions. 15
Nevertheless, international law is still traditionally defined as law binding
exclusively upon states. This definition obviously disregards all international rules that are addressed to supranational agencies and/or private
individuals.
On the whole a vertical view on international law permits the following
definitions of international law:
(1) international law includes rules addressed to states;
(2) international law includes the foregoing rules plus those which are
addressed to private individuals;
(3) international law comprises rules addressed to states, private individuals, and supranational persons.
In the writer's view, only the last definition does justice to the development of international law prior to 1938 and is in keeping with currefit
endeavors to reconstruct and to extend international law.' 59
The prevailing tendency to exclude private individuals and supranational
persons from the definition of international law' 60 is probably due to more
or less conscious nationalistic preconceptions. However that may be, the
exclusion of supranational agencies and private individuals from the realm
5
1'
See note 13 spra.
154 See, for example, the distinction between ad hoc and institutional courts in Lammasch, Die Lehre von der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit in ihrem ganzen Ulnfange, in HAND-

BUCH DES V6LXERRECHTS (1913)

55.

15 5 See, for instance, measures taken by the Council of the League of Nations under
Art.
15 § 6 of the Covenant.
156 Cf. the functions of the Council of the League of Nations in reference to Advisory Opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice. See HuDsoN, op. cit.

supra
note 61, at 513, 523.
57

1 The European Commission of the Danube exercises "legislative powers for
drawing up regulations and executive powers for carrying them out; it even has judicial
powers because it gives sentences in its own name." P. C. I. J., Ser. B, No. 14, at

105 (1927).
15sSee PoLITIs, NEW ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
WAR CRIMINALS: THEIR PROSECUTION & PUNISHMENT
59
1160
See note 288 infra.

(1928) 18. See also
(1944) 128, 213.

GLUECK,

Several authors now plead for the recognition of the personality of the individual,
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of international law actually results in protecting the State, as the absolutely highest person, from any interference from above and in precluding
all international limitations of the States' freedom of action with respect to
private individuals under its jurisdiction.
B.

The Horizontal View on Internationai Law

(1) General and particular international law.-The vertical view on international.law is primarily focussed on the rank of persons in the hierarchic
legal system. 161 From this viewpoint the characteristic features of international rules, indicating both the differences in regard to rules of a lower
level as well as the structural identity with these rules, could be defined even
if there were only one independent State and only one supranational agency.
A horizontal view of international law takes into consideration the number of addressees rather than their rank and furnishes the frame of reference
for the following categories: unilateral, bilateral and multilateral legal
relations ;162 regional'6 and universal relations.
At times "universal law" has been looked upon as synonymous with international law.' 6 4 Although there are several rules of international law which
are of universal applicability, such as rules of customary international law
and general international conventions, it should be noted that there are
many particular international arrangements which are international without
being applicable on a worldwide scale.
It may be politically desirable to enlarge the scope of individual rules by
extending their range to all members of the community of nations. But to
confine the horizontal view on international law only to those rules which
are universally applicable would lead to eliminating from the field of international law a great number of the most significant international conventions.
Several non-universal conventions contain clauses which invite adherence
by non-signatory powers.Y65 By and large, agreements which serve a reciprobut the issue of the international personality of international or supranational agencies
has to the writer's knowledge never been explored in a systematic manner. For an

excellent distinction between international and supranational agencies and action see
Staley, The Economic Implications of Lend Lease (1943)

Supplement to 38 Am. EcoN.

For sovereignty and international agencies see also A. G. B. Fisher,
International Institutions in a World of Sovereign States (1944) 59 Pol. Sci. Q. 1.
16lCf. OPPENHE m, op. cit. supra note 2, at 46 ff.
2
REV. 363, 376.
16 Ibid.
l63Ibid.

164See Justice Story in United States v. The Schooner La Jeune Eugn~nie, 2 Mason's

Reports
409 (1822). ". . . the slave trade is a trade prohibited by universal law .....
165 0n accession and adhesion see F. WILcox, THE RATIFIcATIoN OF INTERNATIONAL
CoNvzmONirs (1935) 57-63 and A. D. McNAIR, THE LAW OF TP, ATIs (1938) 98.

19451

RELATIVE SOVEREIGNTY

cal interest of all adherents, such as the Universal Postal Union, are more
readily adhered to than those agreements which serve the special interests of
individual powers or a power grouping. In the latter case, clauses suggesting
the accession of outsiders may not always express the true intentions of
the original signatories. On the contrary, such a clause by rendering lip
service to universality may merely be designed to cover up the actual exclusiveness of an international arrangement.116
Unfortunately, not only the vertical but also the horizontal view on international law is at times hazy. International rules are occasionally criticized
because they fall short of universal applicability. Contrariwise, rules of
limited applicability are often interpreted as if they were universal; thereby
a few nations arrogate the right of speaking on behalf of the community of
67
nations.'
On the whole, an adequate description of the nature of international law
presupposes a combination of the vertical and the horizontal view on international law as outlined above. The most inclusive international rules-customary or conventional-are those addressed to all States, to one or several
supranational agencies, and to private individuals. However, non-universal
rules may also be international law, provided they comply with the previously stated requirements. 68 In sum, to determine clearly the legal character of an individual rule of international law it is prerequisite to determine
the rank of norms as well as the rank and number of persons implied in a
given legal situation.
(2) Public and private international law.-Another attempt to systematize
legal materials has been based upon the distinction between publik intenational lazw'6 9 and private international law. 170 Whereas under the heading
1661n the Austro-German Protocol of March 19, 1931 both parties declared "their
willingness to enter into negotiations for a similar arrangement with any other country
expressing such a desire." P. C. I. J., Ser. C, No. 53, at 608 (1931). Nevertheless
the Protocol was generally interpreted as an exclusive arrangement. Cf. P. C. I. J.,

Ser. A/B, No. 41, at 52 (1932). The Court held: "It is difficult to deny that the projected r6gime of customs union constitutes a special r6gime and that it affords Germany,
in relation to Austria, 'advantages' which are withheld from third Powers."
167 See Tobin, The Rale of the Great Powers in Treaty Revision (1934) 28 AM. J.
INT. L. 487, 493. On treaties on behalf of "third" powers see also Kelsen, loc. cit.
supra
note 21, at 207, 209.
168See note 138 supra.
69
17 See Triepel, supra note 109 at 81.
' OThe term private international law should not be confounded with "international
private law" or "conflicts of law"; for "conflicts of law" is almost generally considered a branch of domestic law. However, with reference to "that branch of law
which is at the present day usually described as private international law or the
doctrine of the conflict of laws," the Permanent Court of International Justice held
that the "rules thereof may be common to several States and may even be established
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of public international law usually are subsumed those rules addressed to
States or supranational persons, rules usually applied to private individuals
have occasionally been styled private international law.
The unification of private law 171 has often been considered a matter of
international concern. For uniformity of private law may help to eliminate
legal uncertainty and confusion. In this connection the question arises whether
uniform rules of "private" law, adopted by two or more states, are international law, although their primary purpose is to regulate relations among
72
private pesons.1
Since uniform rules of "private" law are in general' 7 - based on international agreements the provisions of which are incorporated into the domestic legal order, the classification of these rules under the heading of
international law seems to present no problem, were it not for the fact
that according to the traditional definition of international law states alone
are addressees of international rules.
An outstanding example of a far-reaching unification of private law is the
convention concerning the "unification of the law of Bills of Exchange,"
concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations. This convention has
been instrumental in bringing about extensive equalization of the law on
Bills of Exchange in 26 States.174 The ultimate addressees of these rules
may be private individuals, including private corporations, an organ of a
by international conventions or customs, and in the latter case may possess the character of true international law governing the relations between States. But apart
from this, it has to be considered that these rules form part of municipal law."
See, however, Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113, 163, 16 Sup. Ct. 139, 143 (1895) ; for
jus 71gentinm privatum see id. at 164, 16 Sup. Ct. at 143.
1 In 1928 the League of Nations established in Rome an International Institute
for the Unification of Private Law designed "to study methods for the assimilation
and co6rdination of private law as between states or groups of states and to prepare
for a gradual adoption by the various states of uniform private law legislation."
See LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFIcIAL JOURNAL (1928) 1752. For similar efforts in the
Western Hemisphere see Res. XVII on Methods for the Codification of International
Law adopted at the 8th International Conference of American States, Lima, Dec. 21,
1938, and especially Code of Private International Law (Bustamente Code) in League
of Nations
Treaty Series No. 1950 (1929).
' 72 See note 170 supra.
1730n the relationship of "private" law to international law see also LAUTERPACHT,
PRIVATE
LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1927) passim.
'7 4These conventions came into force on January 1, 1934. Cf. League of Nations
Document, C.360.M.151.1930.II; Records of the International Conference for the
Unification of Laws on Bills of Exchange, Promissory Notes and Cheques; Text of
the "Convention providing a uniform law for Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes."
Signed at Geneva, June 7. 1930 in League of Nations (1934) 143 TREATY SERIES 259.
Cf. also H. C. Gutteridge, The Unification of the Law of Bills of Exchange (1931) 12
BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 13: see also M. 0. Hudson and A. H. Feller, The International
Unification of Laws concerning Bills of Exchange (1931) 44 HARv. L. REv. 333, and
J.HUPKA. DAS EINHEITLICHE WECHSELRECHT DER GENFER VERTRAGE (1934).
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State, or even a supranational person. In principle, there is no necessity
of limiting to private -individuals the capacity of a person to bind himself
by a negotiable instrument. 175 It is even conceivable that a Bill of Exchange
in which the League of Nations appears as the "drawer" and the Permanent
Court of International Justice as the "drawee" would be subject to the rules
established by the conventions of June 7, 1930, since the Netherlands as
well as Switzerland have ratified the conventions.
This case may illustrate that rules of "private law" are not always exclusively applicable to legal relations among private individuals. In short,
private law rules are those which usudly regulate matters affecting private
individuals. This statement does not preclude exceptional cases, where even
relations between states or supranational agencies are controlled by these
rules.
International Labor Law is perhaps the field in which, from 1920 to 1939,
unification of private law has been most successfully advanced. It has even
been possible to codify the main rules of Labor Law drafted by the International Labor Conference. The International Labour Code, 1939,176 though
a quasi-official venture, bears witness to the work of the International Labor
Organization in this field. But, here again, one should beware of confounding
"international" agreements with universally applicable agreements. Of the
46 Labor conventions which were in force on September 1, 1939, 28 had
been ratified by 15 or more members and of these 28, 21 had been ratified
by .20 or more members, and 10 by 30 or more members. 17T
International Labor Law, though primarily designed to regulate the relationship between business and labor, is not exclusively private law. Apart
from the drafting procedure which entails co6peration of government, business, and labor in accordance with the principle of tripartite representation,"7 8
' 75 The persons capable of being bound by bills of exchange were not defined
by these conventions. See Art. 2 of the Convention for the Settlement of Certain
Conflicts of Law in Connection with Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes, signed
at Geneva, June 7, 1930. League of Nations (1934) 143 Treaty Series, 325. Art 2 (§§ 1, 2)
of this Convention reads as follows: "The capacity of a person to bind himself by a
Bill of Exchange or Promissory Note shall be determined by his national law. If this
national law provides that the law of another country is competent in the matter,
this latter shall be applied. A person who lacks capacity, according to the law specified
in the preceding paragraph, is nevertheless bound, if his signature has been given in
any territory in which according to the law in force there, he would have the requisite capacity." For the various problems related to this provision see Hupka, op. cit.
supra
note 174 at 236, 240.
17 6In addition to relations between employers and employees the International
Labor Organization deals with questions of Forced Labor, Migratory Workers, Public
Works etc. see INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CODE (1941) passim.
17Id. at XIII.
78
See International Labor Office. The L L. 0. and Reconstruction: Report by the
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the rules concerning the supervision of International Labor Conventions are
addressed to a supranational agency, namely the Governing Body of the
9
In addition, the Constitution of the I. L. 0. provides that "Any
I. L. O.7
question or dispute relating to the interpretation .

.

. of any convention ...

shall be referred for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice."' 80 Hence, international labor law includes rules which encompass
82
18
private individuals, states, ' and supranational agencies..

VIII. RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT
A.

Monistic Construction of International Law

The so-called "monistic construction of international law"' 83 aims at an
understanding of domestic and international law from one viewpoint. Granted
that there are differences between international and domestic law, the
monistic approach emphasizes those features that are common to the two
sets of rules rather than the discrepancies between them.
It is submitted that certain legal maxims which are an integral part of
American common law and American constitutional law are predicated
upon a monistic approach, 8 4 to wit: (1)

International law is part of the

common law;185 (2) Treaties are the supreme law of the land;1S6 (3) An
intention to "violate" international law is not to be presumed, even if a

87
statute contradicts controlling international law.'
It is perhaps no exaggeration to state that the foregoing principles are

Acting Director of the InterrntiotalLabour Office to the Conference of the International
Labour Organization (1941) 95, 96.
179Treaty
of Versailles, Art. 408-411.
80

' 81Treaty of Versailles, Art. 423.
' See especially the rules concerning the supervision and the execution of International Labor Conventions. For the "unofficial" interpretation of these conventions
by the International Labour Office see C. H. DILLON, INTERNATIONAL LAOR CONVENTioNs
(1942) 135.
182
See upra p. 143.
183 0n "monism" and "dualism" in international law see TRIEPEL, op. cit. supra note
109 at 84; see also VERoss, DIE VER.FASSUNG DER VbLKERRECHTSGEa EINSCHAFT (1926)
VI, 34; W. ScirFFER, DIr LEHRE vom PRIMAT DES V6LKERRECETS IN DER NEUEREN
LITERATUR (1937) 11; Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International
Law
(1936) 17 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 66.
1841t is interesting to note that Triepel, the most ardent advocate of the dualist doctrine, admits that the monistic approach might be sound in reference to United States
practice. "Aux Etats-Unis la doctrine traditionelle moniste semble atre respect6e plus
Triepel, op. cit. supra note 109, at 90.
fidlement."
' 85See note 120 supra.
186See
note 4 supra and 213 infra.
' 87 See Schroeder v. Bissell, Collector (Over the Top) 5F (2d) 838, 842 (D. Conn.
1925) note 216 infra.
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meaningless on the assumption that the international and the domestic legal
spheres are basically different.188
B. Ride of Law and Monistic Construction of International Law
Several jurists, especially European jurists, see the main task of jurisprudence in conceiving of law as a system of rules of law, (Rechtssiitze).189
Stammler,'90 in particular, has postulated a definition of the rule of law by
reference to what he calls categories of law.191 Unfortunately, Stammler's
theory, though sound in stating the methodological prerequisites of jurisprudence, fails to live up to its self-imposed standards. For Stammler's categories of law are only loosely connected with his definition of law; and
192
the definition of law itself is debatable.
In this essay an attempt has been made to show international rules as
structurally identical with domestic rules. Insofar as there are differences
between international law and domestic law, they can be traced back, above
all, to the supreme rank of international norms. 93
Although many jurists have proposed to express "law" in terms of the
rule of law, they do not agree on the form or the content of the rule of law.
As for the form, two types of grammatical formulas may be distinguished:
Rules of law are usually expressed either in imperative clauses 4 or in
hypothetical clauses.' 98 The imperative doctrine considers law as a command. 98 Yet there are many legal situations which cannot be reconciled
with the imperative theory and which nevertheless are "law." Many rules
do not require the establishment of legal relationships, but simply furnish
the opportunity of doing so. For instance nobody is forced to marry or
establish a corporation; the law only provides for certain legal effects if people
marry or set up a corporation. Moreover, "violations of the law" or disobedience to its command cannot be explained by virtue of the definition
188
89See

'

Austin, op. cit. supra note 124.
For Rechtssatz, see STAMMLER, LERBUCH

DER RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE (1922) 255;
KELSEN, HAUTPROBLEME DER STAATSREICHTSLEHRE: ENTWICKELT AUS DER LEaRE VOm
RPcHTSsATZE (1923) X ff.

19OSee Stammler, ibid.
1911bid.
19 2 Cf. Cohen, Positivisn and the Limits of Idealisn in the Law (1927) 27 COL. L.
REv.
93 241 f.

' See note 7 supra and note 233 infra.
' 94
For example: "Thou shalt not kill," Exodus 20, 13.
195 ft is conspicuous that in the Code of Hammurabi, the oldest Law Code extant,
the rules are couched in conditional clauses. See THE CODE OF HAMMU-AI (2d ed.,
R. F. Harper, 1904). Likewise the formulae issued by the Roman praetor were
hypothetical clauses. For the conditional nature of law see N. M. KoRxuNov, GENERAL TnEoRY OF LAW quoted in Hall, op. cit. supra note 121, at 421. See also KELSEN,
HAuPTPRoLEmE, op. cit. supra note 189, at VII.
' 9 6See e.g. Austin, op. cit. supra note 124.
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of law as command, since law would cease to exist the moment it is disregarded. Another consequence of defining law as command is the assumption that law is a rule for behavior. This view has been countered by some
legal realists who think that law is a rule of behavior rather than rule for
behavior. 197 • Whatever may be the merits of these views, it is probably safe
to say that law invites or suggests rather than prescribes human behavior.
A criminal code, in setting forth that a murderer shall be executed, does
not regulate the behavior of the murderer the moment he commits the crime.
But by attching certain legal effects to the fact "murder" the law attempts
to deter persons from committing murder. In many cases the law does not
suffice to prevent murder, nor can it revive the assassinated person; all the
law can do and usually does is to punish the murderer by depriving him of
life or liberty.
Many jurists who are indifferent to the imperative theory as such maintain that its corollary, the element of "sanction," is an indispensable criterion
of law, when they argue as follows: Law is a command. Who disobeys the
law breaks the law. The community is entitled and obliged to impose sanctions against the law-breaker.
In international relations sanctions are usually not advocated as an end
in itself but as a means to enforce peace.' 98 Yet in reality, sanctions or
coercive measures are not always apt to enforce peace. 99 They cannot
render undone an act of aggression, though they may in the long run prevent the aggressor from enjoying the fruits of aggression. In the ItaloEthiopian incident, however, the only test case of international "economic"
sanctions under the League, the aggressor lost his spoils not on account of
sanctions but only as a consequence of a full fledged war. 2°°
In any case it is hardly correct to speak of "sanctions" as though they were
community actions if and so long as only an individual state or a power
grouping resorts to coercive measures. It is probably not incidental that
the term sanction cannot be found in the Covenant of the League of Nations,
197See K. N. Llewellyn,

The Constitution as an Institution in LEGAL ESSAYS IN

Kip MCMURRAY (1935) 277; see also Pound, Fifty Years of Jurisprudence
(1938) 51 HARv. L. REV. 790-797.
198 See, e.g., the proposals of the League to Enforce Peace in BARTLETT, THE LEAGUE
TO ENFORCE PEACE (1944) especially 28, 36, 71. See also P. C. NASH, AN ADVENTURE
7N WORLD ORDER (1944) especially 81, 86. See also J. S. ALGUY, PERMANENT WORLD
PEACE (1943) 73, 77.
99
TRIBUTE TO ORRIN

1 See Borchard, note 111 supra.
2°°The Emperor Haile Selassie, who was driven into exile May 2, 1936 returned to
his throne in Addis Ababa on May 5, 1941. It should be noted that the term "sanction"
is also conspicuously absent in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals.
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not even in Art. 16,2 11 the so-called sanctions clause.
Coercive measures taken at the instigation of a non-universal organization
vis-a-vis states differ from coercive measures imposed by states sis-a-vis
individuals under their jurisdiction, because in the absence of a world state,
the community of nations cannot claim that monopoly of power that many
20 2
think characteristic of the internal sovereignty of the state.
Moreover under domestic law the private individual does not meet the
State on an equal plane, and even in democracies he has but limited rights
which at times must be sacrificed for the sake of "public policy." Again in
domestic law a sanction imposed by the state upon an individual affects just
this individual and his partners in "lawbreaking"; whereas international
sanctions vis-a-vis states may bring about the downfall of the whole
20 3
community.
In addition, if sanctions are deemed an integral part of law, and economic
or military coercion is considered the prototype of sanctions, international
law would be valid only in wartime or in situations "short of war."
Hence, the legal and social implications of sanctions in international law
are to be clearly distinguished from those in domestic law. Generally speaking, the use of the term sanction in international law is apt to be even more
misleading than in domestic law.
It is difficult to understand why so many jurists and politicians have been
so eager to introduce the term "sanction" into the vernacular of international
law. Presumably one motive for this attitude is the desire to prove that
international law is in part compatible with Austin's imperative doctrine.
Though it is conceded that international law is not a command emanating
from a superior will, it is presented as at least endowed with the power of
sanctions. A more pragmatic motive is the tendency to pretend that actions
of individual states or groups of states are taken on behalf of the community
of nations with the sole purpose of upholding law.
However that may be, the formulation of the rule of law in the form of a
201

0n the genesis of Art. 16 see HUNTER MILLER, THE DRAFTING OF THE

(1928),
pa.sfim.
20

COVENANT

2See MAX WEBER, WRTsCHAF. UND GESELLSCHAFT (2d ed. 1925) 615; Seagle,
op. cit. supra note 128, at 227. See also Kirchheimer, In Quest of Sovereignty (1944)
6 JOURNAL OF POLITICS 139. For a discussion of the "Pluralistic Attack on State
Sovereignty"
see COKER, RECENT POLITICAL THOUGHT (1934) 497, 515.
203
International sanctions differ from domestic sanctions for at least two reasons:
(1) Under traditional law the whole community is "responsible" for acts of the government. (2) Due to total war even the traditional distinction between combatant
and non-combatant has frequently been rendered inapplicable in law and fact For the
question of collective and individual responsibility see KELSEN, PEACE THROUGH LAW

(1944), especially pp. 71-81.
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20 4

hypothetical clause
may avoid the pitfalls of the imperative theory. From
this viewpoint a legal relationship is created if one or more persons act in a
certain manner and if thereby a certain legal effect is brought about. The
term legal effect is broader than the term sanction, above all because it covers
social advantages as well as disadvantages. 20 5 In international relations, for
example, if two or more States conclude a commercial agreement the resulting mutual reduction of tariffs is the legal effect of the agreement.
At this juncture, an attempt to define law may be ventured:
Law i's
a°hierarchic system of meaningful rules of law, limited in time

and spae.20

The individual rules of law which constitute the legal system are
patterned as follows: If a legally relevant fact can be imputed20 7 to2 0 a8
person a legal effect results as provided for in the controlling norm.
This definition of law is designed to cover rules of international as well as
of domestic law and to furnish the structural foundation of a truly monistic
construction of international law.
C. Primcy of InternationalLaw
In contradistinction to the doctrine of the primacy of domestic law, which
implies that in any conflict between international and domestic law the latter
prevails,209 the doctrine of the primacy of international law recognizes, in
210
principle, international law as paramount.
The primacy of international law has been challenged by many international
lawyers on various grounds. It has been refuted Iecause it has been considered just a theory, and not positive international law; because it is an
Austrian theory; because it has usually been presented in conjunction with
more or less unrelated doctrines of philosophical jurisprudence.
Actually, the primacy of international law is not merely a theory,211 but
20
4See note 195 supra.
2
O5See,
206
See
20

e.q., Austin's definition' of "sanction," supra note 132.
note 138 supra.
7For the sake of simplicity only facts are imputed to persons in the above definition.
for208"imputation" in relation to norms see note 134 supra.
"Person," "fact" and "norm" are here used as generic terms including also a
multiplicity
of persons, facts and norms.
20 9
0n the primacy of domestic law see KELSEN, DAS PROBLEM DER SOUVERXNITXT
UND DIE THEORIE DES V6LKERRECHTS (1920) 151. See also P. B. Potter, Relative Au-

thority of International Law and National Law in the United States (1925) 19 Amt. J.

INT. L. 315, 326. ". . . Strictly speaking there is never a conflict of valid laws, of
course, for where laws appear to conflict it will always be found that one of the laws
in question is invalid as ultra vires, and therefore not law at all. But the presentation
21 of the problem in terms of a supposed conflict has certain merits of simplicity ......
oSee note 233 infra.
211Cf. Schiffer, op. cit. supra note 183, at 12.
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a rule which is to be found in many decisions rendered by international 212
as well as domestic courts. Thus in Missouri v Holland212 the Supreme
Court of the United States held that international law prevails whenever
there is a conflict between international and state law.
No doubt the great body of private relations usually 2fall
within the
13

control of the State, but a treaty nsay override its power.

Similarly, every presidential ordinance, whether a proclamation or executive order, is voidable if it is at variance with a controlling international rule.
Thus the Supreme Court declared void a presidential blockade proclamation
214
insofar as it was in conflict with a recognized principle of international law
long before an English Court in the Zamora case asserted the right to examine whether an executive order issued by the King in Council, is com2 15
patible with international law.

It cannot be denied that it is controversial whether a statute which contradicts international law is to be upheld in the courts. American practice
reveals a conspicuous divergence of opinions on this issue. In Schroeder v.
Bissell, Collector (The Over the Top) a statute clearly at variance with
international law was reaffirmed on the ground that
the Court has no option to refuse the enforcement of legislation in contravention of principles of international law. .... 216
212
See the award of the American-Mexican Claims Commission of March 31, 1926
in the case of Company of Texas "It is as little doubtful nowadays as it was in the
day of the Geneva arbitration that international law is paramount to decrees of
nations and to the municipal law.. . ." (1926) 20 Am. J. INT. L. 803; see also P. C. I. J.,
Ser.
212 A, No. 7, at 19 (1926).
'Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416, 434, 40 Sup. Ct. 382, 384 (1920).
21 3
MITCHFLL, STATE INTERESTS IN AMERIcAN TREATIES (1936) 151. "Examination of
certain treaties concerning administrative and police power matters revealed that in all of
these-those dealing with health, drugs, white slavery, obscene publication, -the protection of migratory birds and the protection of the livestock industry-the federal
government has entered the fields of power reserved to the states under the Tenth
Amendment. The state governments, however, were still permitted to enact any legislation in the fields which they saw fit, provided that those measures did not conflict
in any way with the treaties or enabling acts passed under them." See also W.
MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIvE AGREEMENTS (1941) 355 and United States v.
Pink,
214 315 U. S. 203, 233, 234, 63 Sup. Ct. 70 (1942).
See The Peterhoff, 5 Wall. 28, 18 L. ed 564 (U. S. 1866).
215
See The Zamora L. R. 1916, 2 A. C. 77. "The fact that the Prize Court in this
country would be bound by acts of the imperial legislature [sc. even if these acts are
at variance with international law] affords no grounds for arguing that they are bound
by the executive orders of the King in Council." See also Quincy Wright, Conflicts of
InternationalLaw with National Laws and Ordinances (1917) 11 Am. J. INT. L. 1. With
reference to the Zamora case Professor Wright says: "It shows that international law
is not only regarded as a source of law in British Courts, but that, as compared with
the law embodied on Orders in Council it is a superior authority." Id. at 2. (Italics
supplied).
2165F (2d) 838, 842 (D. Conn. 1925).
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By contrast, the Court of Claims held in The Ship Rose:
if ... there was any conflict between the municipal law of the United
States, as exemplified in the statute, and well recognized principles of
international law, the latter must prevail (in this court) in the determination of the rights of the parties ....217
In short, American courts have recognized that international law prevails
over state law and federal ordinances; but when it comes to statutes opinions
are divided. Actually, the great majority of American decisions rule that in
a conflict between a statute and a treaty that which is later prevails.218
In other words, American courts recognize the primacy of international law in
conflicts between international law on the one hand, and state law and federal
ordinances on the other; whereas in conflicts between statutes and international law the primacy of domestic law is usually taken as the guiding
principle. 219 . The issue of whether the Constitution of the United States or
any one of its individual articles is at variance with international law has
apparently never been the object of judicial scrutiny. But a recent statement of a group of leading international lawyers in the United States postu220
lates recognition of international over and above constitutional law.

Although the so-called Austrian school of international law has undoubtedly
furnished many valuable contributions to the formulation and to the refinement of the primacy of international law doctrine, it should not be overlooked
that the supremacy of international law also has been explored by many
non-Austrian international lawyers. Among others, the following European
writers221 have attempted to analyze the nature of the primacy of international
21736 Ct. Cls. 290, 301-2 (1901).
Cf. also P. B. Potter, Relative Authority of International Law and National Law in the United States (1925) 19 Amt. J. IN. L. 315,
324. See also the Minority Opinion in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U. S.581,
596, 9 Sup. Ct. 623 (1888).
"Many persons . . . both in and out of Congress,
were of opinion that so long as the treaty remained unmodified, legislation restricting immigration would be a breach of faith with China." But see contra Whitney v.
Robertson,
124 U. S.190, 194, 8 Sup. Ct. 456. 458 (1888).
218
5ee The Constitution and the Columnists in 112 The New York Law Journal, Dec.
11 and 12, 1944 at 1648, 1664.
219Ibid.
22
OSee The International Law of the Future: Postulates, Principles and Proposals
(1944) 38 Am. J.INT. L. 41, 55; see especially Principle I: "Each state has a legal
duty to carry out in full good faith its obligations under international law, and it may
not invoke limitations contained in its own constitution or laws as an excuse for a
failure to perform this duty." Ibid.; see also Kunz, The International Law of the
Future (1944) 38 Am. POL. Scr. REv. 354, 358.
221For a critical evaluation of the European doctrines see Schiffer op. cit. supra
note 183.
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22 4 Mirkine-Guetzvitch,2 2 5 Anzilotti,2 2 6
law: Krabbe,2 2 2 Duguit,2 2 3 Scelle,
and Salvioli. 2 7 Moreover, several American authorities can be cited who
advocate the primacy of international law. Thus, Professor Hyde maintains:
"International law, as the local law of each State, is necessarily superior to
any administrative regulation or statute or public act at variance with it.
There can be no conflict on an equal plane." 2 28 Similarly Professor Potter
writes: ". . . not only are treaties and customary international law of authority superior to national statutes and the Constitution of the United
States, but also national courts in the United States are bound in observing
Professor Stowell presound principles of law to act upon this fact. '2 2 9
sumably subscribes also to the primacy of international law doctrine, since
230
he proposes to replace the term international law by supranational law.

Recently, Professor Corbett has emphasized the need for recognizing the
superiority of international law over domestic law. 2l
Several critiques have indirectly attacked the primacy of international
law doctrine by finding fault with some true or alleged inconsistencies in the
philosophical presuppositions of the advocates of the doctrine. It may be
submitted, .however, that primacy of international law, subject to the above
enumerated qualifications, m2 is a principle of positive international law whose
validity is independent of personal preferences for Neo-Kantian or NeoThomistic jurisprudence.
The writer firmly believes that every attempt to rebuild the prestige of
international law after World War II in disregard of the primacy of international law will be self-defeating. A new respect for international law
cannot be expected so long as many theorists of international law encourage
222
Krabbe, L'idie inoderne de I'Etat (1926) 13 RECUEIL DES CouRs 579.
223
DUGUIT, SOUvERAINET- Er LIBERTE (1922).
22 4
SCELLE, 1 PRfCIS DE DROIT DES GENs (1932) 32. "Ce principe de la subordination
nicessaire
da droit interne au Droit internationalest fondamental."
225
Mirkine-Guetzdvitch, Droit international et droit constitutionel (1931) 38 RECUFIL
DES2 26CotRs 317, 462.
ANZiLOTTr, 1 CORSO DI DIRITTo INTERNAZIONALE (1928) 49. ". • • ildiritto internazionale & superiore allo Stato nel senso che deriva da un principio che s'impone alia
volonth
dello Stato."
2 27
Salvioli, Les Rigles Ghtiralesde la Paix (1933) 46 REcUEIL DES CouRs 31.
228C. C. HYDE, I INTERNATIONAL LAW (1922) 12.
2 29
See Potter, supra note 209, at 326. See also C. M. PiccioTro, RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE LAw OF ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES (1915)
and Quincy

Wright, International Law in its Relation to ConstitutionalLaw (1923)
L.23234.

17 Am. J.

INT.

OSee STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1931) 9: "'International law' is a misnomer, for this law controls states and for that reason should be designated 'supranational law'."
231P. E. Conazrr, POST-WAR WORLDS (1942) 104.
23
2See notes 140-142a supra.
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nationalists everywhere to escape their international obligations by the simple
device of enacting or decreeing a domestic rule which evades these obligations,
and so long as the same theorists encourage judges everywhere to enforce
domestic rules irrespective of conflicting international rules. If the primacy
of international law will again be denied, the international law of the
future, alas, will very soon be a thing of the past.
D.

Is there a higher law than internationallawf

The principle of the primacy of international law implies that international
norms are absolutely highest in the hierarchy of norms.23S Occasionally, it
has been contended that even within the sphere of international law different
levels should be distinguished.?
In particular the Covenant of the League
of Nations has been interpreted at times as constituting not only a new but
also a higher legal bond.2 35 Art. 20 of the Covenant apparently bears out
this assumption when it provides that all arrangements among Leaguemembers which are incompatible with the provision of the pact are
abrogated. 6
The main purpose of this provision was presumably to discourage the
formation of alliances and counter-alliances within the League.237 Unfortunately, political reality fell short of these expectations.
On the whole, the issue of alliances is still primarily a political one, although it is, in principle, conceivable that at a more advanced stage of international organization all alliances may become outlawed. 23S At present, it
is doubtful whether even after World War II any international court will
be entrusted with deciding on the compatibility of a "defensive" alliance with
other international security arrangements, the more so because even "defensive" alliances can decisively affect the omission or commission of aggressive
233

2

See notes 193 and 210 .rupra.

note 244 infra.
See Lauterpacht. The Covenant as the "Higher Law" (1936) in 17 BRIT. Y. B.
INT.
L. 54.
23
6See Hunter Miller, op. cit. supra note 201, vol. 2 at 280; see also WOLFERS, BRITAIN
2

3See

0

AND FRANCE BETWEEN Two WARS: CONFLICTING STRATEGIES OF PEACE SINCE VERSAILLES

(1940) 107, 157, 167 ff.
237See Art. VIII § 2 of the Peace of Westphalia, STRUPP, 1 DOCUMENTS POUR
SERviR A L'HisToIRE Du DROIT DES GENS (2d ed. 1923) 17. Here the members of the
German Empire are authorized to conclude alliances (foedera) with foreign powers
provided these alliances are not directed against the Emperor and the peace of the
Empire. On alliances and the new "State system" consequent on the Peace of Westphalia see A. Rapisardi Mirabelli, Le Congras de Westphalie (1929) 8 BIBLIOTHECA
VISSERANIA 90.
238

See Woodrow Wilson's characterization of the League of Nations as a disentangling
alliance, quoted in PADOVER, WILSON'S IDEALS (1942) 71.
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acts. Thus the not even ratified Franco-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pact,
signed on May 2, 1935,239 furnished the pretext for the German march
into the Rhineland in 1936.240

International agreements other than alliances might have been outlawed
by Art. 20 of the Covenant. Especially legal questions as defined in Art.
13 Section 2 of the Covenant could have been declared incompatible with the
24
Covenant. '
The question of the "higher law" is in still another sense related to the
principle of the primacy of international law. The most thorough critical
analysis of the principle so far published suggests that the primacy of international law is an outgrowth of a typical League of Nations ideology, and
therefore designates the various theories on the primacy of international
law as League of Nations theories.242 Consistent application of this interpretation would lead to the conclusion that the primacy doctrine is only
meaningful, if at all, within the framework of the League of Nations system.
However, this inference is misleading. For the theoretical superiority of
the substantive international norm over the substantive domestic norm, as
evidenced by many court decisions, is in principle independent of the existence or non-existence of supranational or international agencies.2 43 Actually,
the question of the relative weight of the main sources of international law,
to wit, customary law, treaties, and general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations, may arise even outside the League system. Yet, analysis
244
of this by no means insignificant problem is beyond the scope of this study.
The politico-theological approach which places the sovereignty of God
above the sovereignty of the State cannot be discussed here. However, a
recent Declaration on World Peace issued by the representative religious
239

For Text see LEAGUE oF NATIo Ns, 167 TREATY SERIES 404.

240

For the German contention that the Franco-Soviet Pact of May 2, 1935 is incompatible with obligations undertaken by France under the Covenant and the Locarno
Pact see the German Memorandum of May 29, 1936, A. B. KEITH, 2 SPEECHES AND
DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, 1918-1937 (1938) 39 and the French reply, Id.

at 241
42.
By virtue of Art. 36 of the Statute of the P. C. L J., the Court was authorized to
decide this issue. An interesting proposal to have the Council scrutinize every treaty
prior to its publication by the League has been submitted by the Bulgarian Government.
It reads in part as follows: ".

.

. all agreements, treaties or Conventions submitted

to the League for registration and publication should not be registered and published
before the Council has decided that they are compatible with the Covenant." League of
Nations Official Journal. Special Suppletnent No. 154, at 89.
24
2See Schiffer op. cit. mipra note- 183 at 264.
243
For supremacy of international law in reference to an overall international organization see A Design for a Charter of the General International Organization in International
Conciliation No. 402 (August 1944) 541.
4
24 Cf. FINCH, THE SotmcEs oF MODERN

INTERNATIONAL LAW (1937)
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groups in the United States-, reaffirming that nations, states, and international society are subject to the sovereignty of God, deserves mention as
245
an attack on the absolute sovereignty of the State.
E. Sovereign equality of peaceloving nations.
The rank of the State in the hierarchy of persons entails the mutual
equality of States. 2 46 Accordingly, all sovereign States have certain minimum rights in common. This does not preclude that several States, usually
called the Great Powers, have additional rights over and above the minimum
rights of every member of the community of nations. In other words, although States are equal in some respects they are not necessarily equal in
all respects.
A diplomatic representative of San Marino, it is true, enjoys the same
immunities as every other diplomat of the same rank. But the sum total
of international rights of the United Kingdom, e.g., exceeds by far those
of San Marino.247 Consequently the difference between small and great
powers is not only a difference in fact but also a difference in law.
The unqualified statement that States are equal or unequal under international law is misleading. The truth of the matter is that even from the
viewpoint of international law, States are equal in some respects but unequal
in others.2 48
On this premise, and on this premise only, it is not inconsistent to propose an international organization based on the "sovereign equality of peaceloving nations" which would grant certain rights to all states, or at least to
all of its members, but would reserve certain rights to a limited number of
249
Powers.
245

See Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant Declaration on World Peace in International
Conciliation No. 394 (November 1943) 586. "The organization of a just peace depends
upon practical recognition of the fact that not only individuals but nations, States, and
internationalsociety are subject to the sovereignty of God and to the moral law which
comes
246 from God." Id. at 587. Italics supplied.
See note 21 supra.
247
Liechtenstein, Monaco and San Marino, which had applied for admission to membership in 1920, were not admitted to the League of Nations because they were "small
states."
See League of Nations Records of Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings 820.
4
? 8See DIcKINsoN, op. cit. supra note 16 and GOEBEL, THE EQUALITY OF STATES: A
STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF LAW (1923).
249
See the functions reserved to the permanent members of the Security Council
under the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a General International
Organization, especially Chapter VI of the proposals. For text see International Conciliation, No. 405 (November 1944) 734 ff. See also Statement by Secretary Hull on
Sovereign Equality for all Nations (June 1, 1944) in 10 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
509.
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It is doubtful, however, whether an organization of the "peaceloving
nations" can rightly claim to be a "general," that is to say, universal, organization so long as the leading Axis powers will not be admitted to membership. Until the Axis powers will have furnished sufficient proof that they
have been converted from war-loving into peaceloving nations, the United
Nations organization as proposed in Dumbarton Oaks will at best be a
general organization of the United Nations, but not a universal or global
organization. 250
Pending-the establishment of a global organization there will be at least
five different classes of powers:
1. Members of the United Nations Organization:
1. Permanent Members of the Security Council.
2. Non-permanent members of the Security Council.
3. Members of the General Assembly.
2. Non-Members:
1. States thatZ were enemies of the United Nations during World
War II.2 1
2. States that were neutrals during World War II.
In view of the privileges granted to the leading Powers in the Dumbarton
Oaks proposals, it is to be expected that the inequality of states25 2 will become
more pronounced the more effective the proposed peace organization will be.
One way of counteracting this trend towards increasing inequality among
individual members of the community of nations may be to provide for
functional representation of the secondary and small States in as many fields
as possible.
In this way, it is hoped, will the small and secondary States
have a chance to furnish essential contributions, provided they will be in a
position to develop their cultural inheritance in an environment of economic
opportunity and military securty.
In any case it appears probable that the international organization of the
future, as envisaged, will be a hegemonia 2 55 rather than egalitarian structure.
25 0
DCf. the Statement by the Commission to Study the Organization of Peace: "All
nations must live within the circle of international law and order." International Conciliation
No. 403 (September 1944) 547.
251
The status of Italy, Rumania and Bulgaria as of January 1, 1945 is not quite clear.
After having belonged to the Axis camp for several years they are now co-belligerents of
the25 2United Nations following declaration of war against Germany.
0n inequality of states see C. BEcxaE,
How NEw WILL THE BErE WORLD BE?
(1944)
pp. 84 ff.; see also H. TRIEPEL, DIE HEGEMONIE: (1938).
25 3
Cf. the Dumbarton Oaks proposals on the establishment of an Economic and Social
Council (Chapter IX) loc. cit. supra note 249, at 741. See also MITRANY, A WORKING
PEACE SYsTEM: AN ARGUMENT FOR THE FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL

(1943), and Shotwell, supra note 2 at 205 f.
In Defense of the Small Countries (1943) 33
55See note 252 supra.
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4See Wolfers,
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Progress of Iiiternatiowal Law.

In the inter-war period from 1919-1939 many measures were hailed by
international lawyers and statesmen as outstanding progress in international
law. And it cannot be denied that in several instances, at least temporarily,
progress was achieved.
One way of improving international legal situations was to declare a
subject-matter that had previously been considered within the exclusive
domestic jurisdiction of a State as a matter of international concern. The
Minority Treaties 256 concluded under the auspices of the League of Nations
are perhaps the most striking example of this tendency. Similarly, Articles
10-16 of the Covenant 257 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact 2 5 8 were attempts to
transfer the right to resort to war, the iws ad bellum, from the domestic to
the international sphere.259 Also, the International Labour Organization,
by setting international standards for working conditions and related issues,
treats labor problems as a matter of international concern. 260
Yet, it should be remembered that States, especially the Great Powers,
took great pains lest the League of Nations assume the character of a
Super-state. 26 1 This approach to the League prevented the effective and
consistent transfer of competences from domestic to League jurisdiction; it
enabled the members of the League to retain their anxiously guarded freedom
of action in matters of economic262 and military armament. 263 The League
members were even entitled to remain neutral,2" all emphatic statements to
the contrary notwithstanding.
Currently various efforts to raise certain issues to the international level
256

0n the problem of minorities see C. A. MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATES AND
NATIONAL MINOrIEs (1934); J. STONE, INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES OF MINORITY
RIGHTS (1932); J. ROBINSON (AND OTHERS), WERE THE MINORTIES TREATIES A FAILuE?7 (1943).
2 See Ray op. cit. supra note 29 at pp. 343-531; see also
ANALYSIS
OF OFFICIAL PROPOSALS AND DISCUSSIONS,
258

ENGE.L, LEAGUE REFORMu: AN
1936-1939 (1940) 135, 192, 212-245.

SHOTWELL, WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY AND ITS RENUNCIAPACT OF PAIS (1929).
TION
2 59 IN THE
See the Dumbarton Oaks proposals op. cit. supra note 249, at 730 ff.

260See note 176 .sapra.
2 61
On the League of Nations as an instrument of national policy see Wolfers, op. cit.
note 236, at 321 ff.
supra
2 62
See League of Nations Covenant, Art 23(e).
263
See League of Nations Covenant, Art. 8. On Disarmament see also MYERS, WoRD
ITS PROBLEMS AND PROSPEcTS (1932).
DISARMAMENT:
264
See 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW (6th ed. by Lauterpacht, 1940) 506,
Cf. contra FENWiCK, AMERICAN NEUTRALITY: TRIAL AND FAILURE (1940) 17.
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have been resumed, especially by those individuals and 'groups who advocate
2 65
international safeguards of human rights.
In addition to declaring certain matters as being of international concern,
the establishment of new types of legal machinery has been extolled by many
as progress in international law. Although considerable progress has in
the past been achieved by international agencies, their effectiveness was
frequently hampered by lack of agreement on the policies to be carried out
as well as by the lack of universality. Fortunately, current proposals for
future international organization evidence the desire to avoid at least some
of the mistakes of the past in their new emphasis on economic issues266
2
and on the need for constant coordination on the policy making level.

7

The increased interest in international. law and relations, 268 which is
characteristic of the inter-war period, has also been reflected in the refinement of international rules. Above all, the decisions and advisory opinions
of the Permanent Court of International Justice have greatly contributed to
the more precise formulation of previously hazy concepts and rules of international law.269 And no statesman or international lawyer who honestly
prefers lucidity to double talk can afford to ignore the findings of the Permanent Court of International Justice.
G.

Limitation of Sovereignty.
The attack against the absolute sovereignty of the State2 7 0 is meaningful

insofar as it rightly emphasizes that under international law even sovereign
States are limited by international law in relation to other States, to supranational agencies, and to private individuals. Customary international law
provides such jurisdictional limitations with respect to other states and
individuals, whereas international conventions may be extended to limitations of sovereignty concerning States, individuals, and supranational
agencies.
There can be no doubt that the "absolute sovereignty" of the State has
been and can be restricted by international law.27 1 It is quite a different
26 5

See QUINCY WRIGHT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD ORDER

(1943) 13; Ameri-

can Law Institute. International Bill of Rights: Report by William Draper Lewis
(1943).
266
267See note 253 supra.
1t is the declared purpose of the proposed United Nations Organization "to afford
a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends."
Loc.
26 8 cit. supra note 249, at 730. See International Conciliation No. 405 (Nov. 1944) 730.
CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, 1919-1939 (1940)

269
See
270
See
27 1

3.

HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 113.
note 2 supra.

Contra M. ADLER, How TO THINK ABOUT WAR AND PEACE (1944)
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proposition, however, whether States want to limit their sphere of domestic
jurisdiction 272 and their freedom to take political decisions independently
of other states. 273 Furthermore, a distinction must be made between unilateral
and mutual limitation of sovereignty. The victors in World War II will
probably be in a position to impose unilateral limitations of sovereignty upon
the vanquished by requiring, for instance, disarmament of the Axis powers
but reserving the right for themselves to remain armed "pending the
establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security. ' 274
For the "period of transition" this and similar unilateral limitations of
sovereignty will presumably be a wise policy. But let there be no mistake,
unilateral limitations applied to State B in favor of State A do not necessarily lead to an equalization of the power position of these States, but rather
to a strengthening of State A at the expense of State B. 275 How far the
United Nations will go in limiting sovereignty in their mutual relations
remains to be seen.
On the whole, limitation of national sovereignty, that is to say limitation
of the sphere of domestic jurisdiction, is neither an end in itself, nor a
sufficient safeguard of peace. 276 Its effectiveness will depend on the soundness of the legal, social, and economic setting in which it is designed to
operate.
H.

The outlook for internationallaw.

Time and again, international law has been subject to severe criticism by its
opponents and adherents.
A considerable number of jurists maintain that international law is not
law, because the structure of international rules is basically different from
the structure of domestic rules. An attempt has been made here to disprove
this argument. 277 Other critiques of international law deny the legal charis no meaning to the phrase 'limited sovereignty' in the sphere of foreign affairs. The
external
sovereignty of a political community is either complete or nonexistent."
272
See Becker note 252 supra pp. 44-74.
273
See C. A. RICHES, THE UNANIMITY RULE AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1933)
216. "The debates in both the Assembly and the Council indicate clearly a belief on the
part of most of the members that the existence of the unanimity rule, even though not
adhered to strictly, constitutes a protection for the sovereignty of states. Moreover, the
great powers, especially those which do not feel that a League which can act with
promptness and dispatch is essential for their security, find the maintenance of the
unanimity rule convenient, although frequently acquiescing or even conniving in its
circumvention."
2 74
See Point 8 of the Atlantic Charter.
275
See Aufricht, supra note 31, at 123.
276bid.
7
27 See notes 206-208 supra.
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acter of international law on the ground that international law often does
not fulfill its prime function, the safeguarding of peace. It should be recalled, however, that even constitutional law, though almost generally recognized as true law, does not always prevent the outbreak of civil wars.
Unfortunately, even the adherents of international law who sincerely aim
at the advancement of international legal relations are not always agreed
on how to improve international law.
One school sees the essence of law in punitive sanctions and is bent upon
"putting teeth" into international law. Yet, it is more than doubtful
whether the mere threat of physical force will actually bring about the expected effect, namely, peace on earth. Another theory of international law,
recently proposed by Niemeyer in his thoughtful book Law without Force
suggests in substance to pull down the whole structure of international
law as we know it and to subscribe to the "functional" approach to international law.

278

To be sure, even if Austin's definition of law as a command issued by the
sovereign, inflicting evil or pain, were an adequate description of domestic
law, it is unlikely that the endeavor to conceive of law solely in terms of
27 9
criminal law will yield satisfactory results in international legal relations.
Also, Niemeyer's vision of the community of nations as a more or less
amorphous agglomeration of social units hardly contributes toward clarifying the basic issues of international law and society.280
More realistic are those post-war planners who think in terms of "federa'z
tion,"2'
for federations are not necessarily confined to the realm of legal
the6ry, but may become living institutions. In general, a distinction should
be matde between proposals that follow closely the pattern of genuine
federations and those plans that refer to the concept of federation merely
by way of analogy. On the whole, the pattern of federation, even if it cannot
be immediately realized on a world-wide scale, may serve at least as a yardstick of the actual status of international organization.
At present, the creation of independent regional28 2 or subregional 2s fed278
See
279
See
28

NIEmEYEE, LAW vWITHOUT FORCE (1941) 98, 101, 312.
Borchard, note 1.11 supra.
OFor Niemeyer's criticism of the personalistic concept of international law see op. cit.
supra
note 278, at 293, 298, 299, 348.
281
For a critical survey of recent literature on Federalism see CoR3ET, op. cit. supra
note
230; see also WYNNER AND LLOYD, SEARCHLIGHT ON PEACE PLANS (1944).
282
See Corbett, id. at 20, 37, 50; on European Federation see also RESEARCH SEmINAR
FOR EUROPEAN

FEDERATION.

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY.

DRAFT CONSTITUTION

OF THE

UNITED
STATES OF EuRoE (1944).
28
3Many projects for subregional federations, especially for Europe, have been advanced; see, for instance, GESHiOxFF, BALKAN UNION (1940) and F. GROSS, CROSSROADS
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erations as well as the creation of a world federation 2 84 appears unlikely.
In the circumstances, it is to be expected that future international legal relations will in many respects resemble those relations that prevailed prior to
the outbreak of World War 11.285 Accordingly, progress in international
law will presumably follow the general trend of the inter-war period. In
other words, new facts, such as television, will be the object of international
law; several matters that heretofore had been regulated exclusively by
domestic law will be transferred to international jurisdiction;286 new persons or personal units-States, ind'ividuals and supranational agencies-will
28 7
emerge as legal entities..
(a) Redefinition of international law.-The theory of international law
will have to keep pace with the above outlined trends; in particular the
dogma that only States are persons in international law will have to be
discarded. Supranational agencies as well- as individuals will have to be
28 8
recognized as addressees of international law.
Failure to recognize the legal personality of international or supranational
agencies would mean that all existing and all future international agencies
will operate in a sphere of lawlessness. The traditional theory of international law is apparently still under the spell of Aristotle's statement that
"States" have no magistracies in common that will enforce their engagements; different states have each their own magistracies. 28 9 Obviously,
such an attitude makes for legal uncertainty. It remains obscure whether
international or supranational agencies can be parties to a dispute before an
international or domestic court; whether these agencies are authorized to issue
rules addressed to states, individuals, or other international agencies;
whether acts emanating from these agencies may be reviewed as to their
compatibility with the underlying charter that in most instances furnishes the
basis for the legal existence of these agencies. In short, international or
OF

Two

CONTINENTS:

A

DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION OF EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE

(1944).

Compare, however, "What is behind the East European Federation Scheme?", Information Bulletin (August 24, 1943) 6, published by the Embassy of the Union of Soviet
Socialist
Republic in Washington.
2 4

For literature on World Federation see note 281 supra.
See Shotwell supra note 2 at V.
6See Postulate 4 for the International Law of the Future, op. cit. supra note
220 at 54. "Any failure by a State to carry out its obligations under international
8

285

28

law287is a matter of concern to the Community of States."

See Principle 5, id.: "Each State has a legal duty to co~perate with other States
in establishing and maintaining agencies of the Community of States for dealing with
matters of concern to the Community, and to collaborate in the work of such agencies."
See
28 8also SUMNER WELLES, THE TIME FOR DECISION (1944) 365, 373.

5ee
289See

note 159 mupra.

ARISTOTLE, POLITICS,

1280 b.
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supranational agencies should, for the sake of legal certainty, be treated as
29
90
legitimate legal entities2 rather than as de facto corporations. '
In addition, denial of legal personality to private individuals may hamper
the progress of international law. Were individuals excluded from the
realm of international law, all treaties for the protection of minorities, all
international labor conventions, all proposals for an international Bill of
Rights 292 would be legally meaningless.
practical significance of the
These illustrations may serve to indicate the 293
law.
international
of
redefinition
propbsed
above
(b) The future of sovereignty.-In the current literature on post-war
planning the following attitudes toward the concept of sovereignty can be
distinguished: First, several authors propose to discard the concept of
sovereignty altogether and to delete the term from the political dictionary,294
Second, there are skeptics who maintain that nothing can be done about
sovereignty ;295 Third, there are advocates of limitation of sovereignty;296
Fourth, it has been proposed to make use of sovereignty rather than to
297
renounce it.

It is extremely improbable that "sovereignty" will be completely banned
from legal and political parlance. For in a hierarchic system such as the
legal system certain rules, norms, or persons must be recognized as supreme.298 Furthermore, several rules of international law are contingent
on the sovereign rank of States2 99 as well as on the recognition of the sphere
of exclusive domestic jurisdiction. 30 0
29
OSee Aufricht, (1941) PRoc. Am. Soc. INT. L. 46. See also International Labour
Office. Inttergovernmental Commodity Control Agreements (1943) LV. With reference to the legal status of international Commodity Control Boards the preface states:
"The legal status enjoyed hitherto by the control authorities is highly indeterminate.
All these authorities appear to lack any defined status in either international or municipal law. . . . This consideration strengthens the case for some clarification of the
legal status of the control authorities, probably involving the attribution to them of legal
personality."
291
0n de facto corporations see Pound, loc. cit. supra note 197.
292
See
note 265 supra.
293
See supra p. 325.
29 4
See MERRIAM, PUBLIc & PRIvATE GOVERNMENT (1944) 22. On the "absurdity" of
the "legal concept of sovereignty" see MAcIvR, TowARDs AN ABIDING PEACE (1943)
22.295
See Adler, op. cit. supra note 271, at 93.
29
See Eagleton, Organization of the Community of Nations (1942) 36 Am. J. INT.
234.
L 229,
7
W See Wendell Willkie, Our Sovereignty: Shall We Use It? (1944) 22 FOREIGN

AFFAms
347.
29 8

5ee Merriam, 'op. cit. supra note 294, at 31: "The framework of sovereignty as
apex of a hierarchy will remain where it is."
the29legal
9
See
notes 18 and 19 supra.
30
oSee supra p. 147.
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Another school holds that nothing can be done about sovereignty, at least
nothing about "external sovereignty."301 Such a rigid approach is obviously
at variance with legal experience. For States may and can limit their "national sovereignty" by reaching international agreements to this effect or by
simply living up to the limitations imposed by general principles of international law.
Limitations on sovereignty may lead and have led, at least temporarily, to
a decrease of international frictions. Limitations on sovereignty over and
above those implied in customary international law and the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations may be brought about either by outright renunciation of rights otherwise reserved to states under international
law or by transfer of certain rights from the domestic to the international
sphere.
Granted that "sovereign rights" can be limited under international law,
it should be remembered that a State retains, so-to-say, residual sovereign
rights inherent in its rank under international law. These residual rights
which a state enjoys after having submitted to limitations of national
sovereignty should not be ignored, but should be used in the service of sound
and constructive policies. In sum, limitation of national sovereignty and use
of national sovereignty are not mutually exclusive. The reciprocal trade
agreements program of the United States is a case in point. While it provides for the lowering of tariff barriers and thereby limits the sovereign
power of the United States to regulate tariffs at will, it seeks to encourage
trade activities within the agreed limitations of sovereignty.
(c) The rule of law in international relations.-World War II reflects
an unprecedented crisis in confidence. In a world of international anarchy
it will be impossible to restore confidence in human decency. Instead, alldevouring suspicion will constantly undermine mutual trust, the very foundation of human society.
The reconstruction and advancement of international law can be one
means, but not the only one, of restoring confidence on a world scale. Even
"realists" will concede that neither sound political nor sound economic relations can be resumed unless man will regain a minimum degree of certainty
about the legal consequences of his actions. No State could function effectively and humanely unless the great majority of its citizens could anticipate
the legal consequences of their deeds and omissions. And the same holds
true of international relations among states and individuals.
801

See Adler, op. cit. supra note 271, at 93.
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Reaffirmation of the "rule of law" in international relations is generally
considered a prerequisite of durable peace. Hence it is one of the foremost
tasks of international lawyers to define more clearly than heretofore the
meaning of the rule of law. 30 2 Furthermore, if international law is to be
effective, the principle of the superiority of international law over domestic
30 3
law, subject to the aforesaid qualifications, must be recognized.
In conclusion, the rule of law in international relations and sovereignty
are not necessarily incompatible concepts. They are incompatible only on
the basis of a doctrine of "absolute" sovereignty 3°4 that considers States to be
entirely independent of international law.30 5 By contrast, "relative" sovereignty can and should be construed in reference to the necessary elements
of the rule of law.
Today, states and individuals face the alternatives of submitting to chaos
or attempting once again the advancement of legal relations among nations.
Whoever strives in the face of tremendous difficuties to extend the rule of law
to the conduct of States may be heartened by the words of Elihu Root:
"It was during the appalling crimes of the Thirty Years war that Grotius
wrote his De Jure Belli ac Pads and the science of international law first
took form and authority. The moral standards of the Thirty Years war
have returned again to Europe with the same intolerable consequences. We
may hope that there will be again a great new departure to escape destruction by subjecting the nations to the rule of law." 306
30

2See notes 206-208 supra.

303
See
304

notes 140-142a supra.
1t is noteworthy that even Hobbes, who probably more emphatically than any one
of his predecessors advocated the principle of absolute and undivided sovereignty
apparently meant only that the internal sovereignty should be absolute and undivided
under the law of God. See HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, (1651) Part 3, Chap. 33. ". . . the
question of the Authority of the Scriptures, is reduced to this, Whether Christian
Kings, and the Sovereign Assemblies in Christian Commonwealths, be absolute in their
own Territories, immediately under God...." Thus even Hobbes' absolute and undivided sovereignty, was sovereignty under law.
3
note 33 suipra.
300See
6
See E. Root, The Outlook for InternationalLaw (1915) PRoc. Am. Soc. INT. L. 10.

